Using an estimated DSGE model with monetary and fiscal policy interactions and allowing for equilibrium indeterminacy, we find that a passive monetary and passive fiscal policy regime prevailed in the pre-Volcker period. This gave rise to self-fulfilling beliefs and unconventional transmission mechanisms of policy shifts: unanticipated increases in interest rates increased inflation and output, while unanticipated increases in lump-sum taxes decreased inflation and output. We show that had the monetary policy regime of the post-Volcker era been in place pre-Volcker, inflation volatility would have been lower by 25% and the rise of inflation in the 1970s would not have occurred.
I. Introduction
M ACROECONOMIC models that are estimated and used for monetary policy analysis typically abstract from nontrivial monetary and fiscal policy interactions. A theoretical literature starting with the work of Sargent and Wallace (1981) and Aiyagari and Gertler (1985) has, however, long emphasized that monetary and fiscal policies jointly determine equilibrium model dynamics. Moreover, the recent crisis, which has brought to the fore issues of monetary and fiscal policy interactions due to unconventional monetary policy actions that can have significant effects on the government budget and great uncertainty about the future course of fiscal policy, provides an additional impetus to model monetary and fiscal policies jointly in models geared toward policy analysis.
Motivated by these considerations, we extend a standard dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model to include a nontrivial fiscal policy. Similar to the standard rule for monetary policy that governs how nominal interest rates respond to inflation and output our model features a feedback rule for fiscal policy that determines how taxes respond to debt and output and how government spending responds to output. In such a setup, as Leeper (1991) , Sims (1994) , and Woodford (1995) , show, the equilibrium model dynamics depend crucially on monetary and fiscal policy stances, that is, the strength with which policies respond to the state of the economy. Equilibrium in our model is determinate under two cases: when both the interest rate response to inflation and the tax response to debt are strong (an active monetary and passive fiscal policy regime) or when both responses are weak (a passive monetary and active fiscal policy regime). Indeterminacy of equilibrium arises when a weak interest rate response to inflation is coupled with a strong response of taxes to debt (a passive monetary and passive fiscal policy regime). 1 The model is solved using the method proposed by Lubik and Schorfheide (2003, 2004) and is fit to data on both conventional and fiscal variables through Bayesian methods. Following a large literature, we split the data into two time periods based on the timing of Paul Volcker's chairmanship at the Federal Reserve and assess the best-fitting policy regime in each period. We then use the best-fitting model as a laboratory to answer four broad set of questions. First, what monetary and fiscal policy regimes characterized postwar U.S. data? Second, what were the monetary and fiscal policy transmission mechanisms over time? Third, which shocks were the primary sources of short-and long-run variation in inflation? Fourth, what would have been the path of inflation under a counterfactual monetary policy regime different from the estimated one? While these questions are classic, allowing for the possibility of indeterminacy in estimating a DSGE model that features monetary and fiscal policy interactions is a distinct contribution of our paper, and one that matters for our results.
Our main findings are as follows. 2 First, we find that the best-fitting model pre-Volcker, is a passive monetary and passive fiscal policy regime; post-Volcker, it is an active monetary and passive fiscal policy regime. As a result, there was equilibrium indeterminacy in the pre-Volcker era. Thus, our findings are consistent with earlier studies that focus only on monetary policy, such as Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2000) , Mavroeidis (2010) , Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011) , Boivin and Giannoni (2006) , and Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) .
Second, equilibrium indeterminacy pre-Volcker substantially altered the propagation mechanism of shocks, which leads to different transmissions of monetary and fiscal policies in the two time periods. For example, while post-Volcker, an unanticipated increase in interest rates led to a decrease in output and inflation, it led to an increase in output and inflation pre-Volcker. Moreover, while post-Volcker, an unanticipated increase in the lump-sum tax revenues-tooutput ratio had no effects on output or inflation, it decreased output and inflation pre-Volcker.
Pre-Volcker, in contrast to post-Volcker when the policy transmission mechanisms conformed to standard monetary theories, the effects on output and inflation of policy shocks were thus similar to those predicted by the fiscal theory of the price level (FTPL). 3 The similarity, however, is not because the mechanism underlying FTPL is operative, as the theory applies, only under a passive monetary and active fiscal policy regime. It is instead due to both changes in the nature of the solution and agents' self-fulfilling beliefs under indeterminacy. 4 Despite such a similarity, the two regimes are different in several other dimensions, and our best-fitting regime is well identified.
These findings about the effects of monetary and fiscal policy shocks in the pre-Volcker period are new to the literature. For example, Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) find that in the indeterminate policy regime of the pre-Volcker period, inflation does not rise on impact following an interest rate increase. Our results are in fact quite close to those obtained from the identified VAR literature. Since the work of Sims (1992) , it has been observed that in many VAR specifications, inflation tends to increase on impact following a contractionary monetary policy shock. This has been dubbed the "price puzzle" in the literature since it goes against the predictions of the standard models of price-level determination. Hanson (2004) in a comprehensive study shows that this price puzzle seems to be a feature only of the pre-Volcker period and not for the entire postwar U.S. data. Our results are thus consistent with his findings and, moreover, have a model-based interpretation. In addition, Sims (2011) provides some VAR-based evidence on predictory power of fiscal variables in explaining U.S. inflation. We provide complementary evidence from our estimated model on this front, albeit only for the pre-Volcker period.
Third, monetary and fiscal policy shocks play only a minor role in the dynamics of inflation and output in both time periods and at both the short and long run. The result that random variations in monetary policy do not explain much 3 Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2011) is a recent survey of the FTPL literature. Under FTPL, an increase in interest payments due to a contractionary monetary policy increases spending by agents because of a positive wealth effect. This then leads to an increase in inflation and output. Moreover, shifts in fiscal policy influence inflation and output under FTPL due to wealth effects. Bhattarai, Lee, and Park (2014a) contains a detailed treatment of these effects in a simpler model. 4 One major reason for this similarity is that an unanticipated increase in interest rates can lead to an increase in inflation under either FTPL or indeterminacy in the standard sticky-price model. As is well understood, inflation increases due to wealth effects under FTPL. On the other hand, indeterminacy under passive monetary and passive fiscal policy changes the nature of the solution in a way such that the component of the solution that is a unique function only of the structural model parameters implies that inflation rises in response to interest rate increases. This is shown analytically in Bhattarai et al. (2014a) in a simple sticky-price model. Obviously the indeterminate component-the part that is governed by agents' self-fulfilling beliefs-can countervail that effect strongly, in which case inflation may decline. Both cases are fully explored in this paper. of the fluctuation in the data is consistent with the results in the identified VAR literature, for example, in Sims and Zha (2006a) , and also with the DSGE literature, for example, Smets and Wouters (2007) . That the same conclusion also holds for random variations in fiscal policy, given by unanticipated movements in tax revenues-to-output ratios, is new, to our knowledge, to the DSGE literature that features both monetary and fiscal policies. 5 While we find that random disturbances to policy do not matter significantly, this does not imply that the systematic component to policy is also unimportant. In fact, to the contrary, the propagation mechanisms of shocks are substantially different pre-and post-Volcker, precisely because the systematic components of policy were different. A similar point can be made for indeterminacy. Sunspot shocks introduced pre-Volcker due to indeterminacy play a minor role in the dynamics of inflation and output. This, however, does not imply that indeterminacy is unimportant, as it produces a different propagation mechanism of fundamental shocks, as mentioned above.
Fourth, pre-Volcker, in sharp contrast to post-Volcker, variations in the inflation target do not explain low-frequency movements in inflation. 6 Several recent studies, including Ireland (2007) and Cogley, Primiceri, and Sargent (2010) , show that the long-run variation in inflation is explained mostly by changes in the (smoothed) inflation target both pre-and post-Volcker. While we find a similar result in the post-Volcker period, our results are different in the pre-Volcker era: changes in the inflation target explain only about 10% of the long-run variation in inflation. The reason for this difference is that under our best-fitting regime, pre-Volcker, inflation target movements do not track actual inflation: an increase in the interest rate, triggered by the central bank's decreasing the inflation target, tends to increase inflation, as pointed out above. 7 Fifth, the primary sources of short-and long-run variation in inflation are different in the two time periods because of changes in policy stances. Post-Volcker, lowfrequency movement in inflation is explained by changes in the inflation target. The high-frequency movement is mostly explained by markup shocks, also a standard result. In contrast, no single shock played a predominant role pre-Volcker at either horizon; rather, all "nonpolicy shocks" of both demand and supply types were major drivers of inflation 5 Our results are complementary to those of Leeper, Plante, and Traum (2010) , who use a real model with a rich specification of fiscal policy. While detailed variance decomposition results are not available in the paper, one can reasonably infer from their impulse response analysis that random variation in fiscal policy might not have had quantitatively significant effects on macroeconomic variables. Their use of a real model, though, precludes a comparison with our results in terms of inflation. 6 In Bhattarai et al. (2014a) , we provide several analytical results that characterize the role of a time-varying inflation target in a simple stickyprice DSGE model under different policy regimes. 7 Davig and Doh (2014) do not find a significant role for time-varying inflation target in explaining low-frequency inflation movements in postwar U.S. data while allowing for regime switching in both policy coefficients and volatility. Our result, in a setup that considers subsample estimation, is different from theirs since we do find a role for a time-varying inflation target in the post-Volcker era. dynamics. In particular, since monetary policy was passive pre-Volcker, demand shocks, which would typically be stabilized under active monetary policy, end up influencing inflation dynamics significantly.
Sixth, in a counterfactual exercise, we show that had the more aggressive monetary policy regime of the post-Volcker era been in place pre-Volcker, inflation volatility would have been significantly lower: the predicted standard deviation of inflation is 2.03% compared to the actual value of 2.72%. Moreover, the persistent rise of inflation in the 1970s would not have occurred. Our results are thus consistent with the "good policy" hypothesis that a change in monetary policy after Paul Volcker assumed chairmanship at the Federal Reserve led to a stabilization of inflation. 8 Our paper is related to several other papers that estimate a monetary DSGE model with nontrivial fiscal policy. Important recent contributions include Drautzberg and Uhlig (2011) , Traum and Yang (2015) , and Zubairy (2014) . In addition, Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2012) estimate fiscal rules with volatility shocks and feed them into a standard mediumscale DSGE model, and Leeper, Richer, and Walker (2012) analyze effects of fiscal foresight. A relative contribution of our paper is to estimate a DSGE model with nontrivial interactions of monetary and fiscal policies, while allowing for multiple equilibria. Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) assess the role of equilibrium indeterminacy due to passive monetary policy but abstract from fiscal policy, while Kim (2003) and Traum and Yang (2011) tackle monetary and fiscal policy interactions but abstract from the possibility of equilibrium indeterminacy. In a closely related independent paper, Bianchi and Ilut (2015) estimate a model with a switch from an active fiscal to passive fiscal regime and use it to explain the rise of inflation in the 1970s, while also abstracting from equilibrium indeterminacy. Their method allows for an interesting analysis of how the possibility of regime switching can alter the properties of the solution by affecting an agent's beliefs. We make it clear later in the paper why allowing for both a nontrivial fiscal policy and indeterminacy is crucial for our results, and that constitutes our relative contribution.
II. Model
Our model is based on the prototypical New Keynesian setup (e.g., as in Woodford, 2003) , augmented with some propagation mechanisms and a complete description of fiscal policy.
A. Households
There is a continuum of households in the unit interval. Each household specializes in the supply of a particular type of labor. A household that supplies labor of type-j maximizes the utility function,
where C j t is consumption of household j, C t is aggregate consumption, and H j t denotes the hours of type-j labor services. The parameters β, ϕ, and η are, respectively, the discount factor, the inverse of the (Frisch) elasticity of labor supply, and the degree of external habit formation. Finally, δ t represents an intertemporal preference shock that follows
where P t is the price level, B j t is the amount of one-period riskless nominal government bond held by household j, R t is the interest rate on the bond, W t ( j) is the competitive nominal wage rate for type-j labor, Π t denotes profits of intermediate firms, and (S t − T t ) denotes government transfers net of taxes. 9 In addition to the government bond, households trade at time t one-period state-contingent nominal securities V j t+1 at price Q t,t+1 , and hence fully insure against idiosyncratic risk.
B. Firms
The final good Y t , which is consumed by the government and households, is produced by perfectly competitive firms assembling intermediate goods, Y t (i), with a Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) 
, where θ t denotes time-varying elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods that follows θ t =θ 1−ρ θ θ ρ θ t−1 exp(ε θ,t ) with the steady-state valueθ. The corresponding price index for the final consumption good
Monopolistically competitive firms produce intermediate goods using the production function, Y t (i) = A t H t (i), where H t (i) denotes the hours of type-i labor employed by firm i and A t represents exogenous economy-wide technological progress. The gross growth rate of technology a t ≡ A t /A t−1 follows a t =ā 1−ρ a a ρ a t−1 exp(ε a,t ), whereā is the steady-state value of a t and ε a,t ∼ i.i.d. N 0, σ 2 a .
As in Calvo (1983) , a firm resets its price optimally with probability 1 − α every period. Firms that do not optimize adjust their price according to the simple partial dynamic indexation rule, P t (i) = P t−1 (i)π γ t−1π 1−γ , where γ measures the extent of indexation andπ is the steady-state value of the gross inflation rate π t ≡ P t /P t−1 . 10 All optimizing firms choose a common price P * t to maximize the present discounted value of future profits:
C. Government
Budget constraint. Each period, the government collects lump-sum tax revenues T t and issues one-period nominal bonds B t to finance its consumption G t , lump-sum transfer payments S t , and interest payments. 11 Accordingly, the flow budget constraint is given by
Monetary policy. The central bank sets the nominal interest rate according to a Taylor-type rule,
which features interest rate smoothing and systematic responses to deviation of output from its natural level Y * t and deviation of inflation from a time-varying target π * t . The natural level of output is the output that would prevail under flexible prices and in the absence of shocks to θ t . The steady-state value of R t isR, and the nonsystematic monetary policy shock ε R,t is assumed to follow i.i.d. N 0, σ 2 R . The inflation target evolves exogenously as π * t =π 1−ρ π π * t−1 ρ π exp(ε π,t ), where ε π,t ∼ i.i.d. N 0, σ 2 π .
10 Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011) show that with nonzero steady-state inflation and nonindexation of prices to past inflation, the indeterminacy region of a model like ours expands substantially relative to the Taylor principle. In our model, with the partial dynamic indexation rule specification, this issue does not arise, and the long-run response of interest rates to inflation is still the relevant condition for determinacy. 11 In future work, we could relax the restriction of one-period government bonds by allowing for long-term debt, as in Cochrane (2001) . This will reduce inflation volatility under a passive monetary and active fiscal policy regime.
Fiscal policy. We assume parsimonious fiscal policy rules that somewhat resemble the interest rate rule (1). 12 The fiscal authority sets its two fiscal policy instruments, tax revenues and government spending, according to the fiscal rules
Fiscal rule (2) features tax smoothing and systematic responses of tax revenues-to-output ratio to deviation of lagged debt-to-output ratio from a time-varying target b * t−1 and deviation of output from its natural level. The steadystate value of τ t isτ, and the nonsystematic tax policy shockε τ,t is assumed to follow i.i.d. N 0,σ 2 τ . Similar to the inflation target, the debt-to-output ratio target evolves exogenously as (3), motivated by the empirical findings of Cúrdia and Reis (2010) , features government consumption smoothing and (potentially) countercylical responses of government spending-to-output ratio to the lagged output gap. The steady-state value of g t isḡ, and the exogenous shock to government spendingε g,t follows i.i.d. N 0,σ 2 g . 13 Finally, government transfers follow an exogenous process given by
wheres is the steady-state value of s t and ε s,t ∼ i.i.d. N 0, σ 2 s . 14
D. Equilibrium, Policy Regimes, and Determinacy
Equilibrium is characterized by the prices and quantities that satisfy households' and firms' optimality conditions, government budget constraint, monetary and fiscal policy rules, and the clearing conditions for the product, labor, and asset markets:
The monetary policy specification is standard, although some extended versions of equation (1) are often employed in the DSGE literature. The specification of the tax rule is similar to that in Leeper (2007b, 2011) and Sims (2011) . While some recent studies consider more elaborate fiscal rules with realistic empirical features-for example, Leeper et al. (2010) model different types of distortionary taxes separately rather than an aggregate measure of tax revenues-we focus on a simple specification to keep the model relatively standard. It will be interesting to investigate if new results emerge when the model is extended in various dimensions regarding the specifications of monetary and fiscal policy. In a robustness exercise, we consider some alternative specifications that are relatively straightforward to incorporate in our current framework. We leave more involved extensions that would substantially alter our framework as a future research project. 13 In Bhattarai, Lee, and Park (2012) we used a simple specification where government spending followed an exogenous process. 14 We introduce this exogenous process for transfers to help the model fit the data on fiscal variables.
The details of the equilibrium conditions are provided in the online appendix (section 1.1).
We use approximation methods to solve for equilibrium: we detrend variables on the balanced growth path by normalizing with A t and obtain a first-order approximation to the equilibrium conditions around the nonstochastic steady state. 15 The linearized equations are standard and are provided in the online appendix (section 1.2). Here we describe the linearized policy rules and the government budget constraint to facilitate our discussion of determinacy and policy regimes:
The equilibrium of the economy will be determinate if either monetary policy is active while fiscal policy is passive (the AMPF regime) or monetary policy is passive while fiscal policy is active (the PMAF regime). Multiple equilibria exist if both monetary and fiscal policies are passive (the PMPF regime). In our model, we can analytically characterize the boundaries for the various policy regimes. 16 In particular, monetary policy is active 15 We denote variable X t /A t byX t . We define the log deviation of a variable X t from its steady-state X asX t = ln X t − lnX, except for the four fiscal variables
16 This analytical solution for the boundaries is possible because we consider lump-sum taxes and transfers only. In Bhattarai, Lee, and Park (2014b), we derive analytically a necessary and sufficient condition for the boundary of monetary policy in a model with exogenous government spending. The necessary and sufficient condition requires a weak restriction on the parameter space, which is not numerically relevant. We can apply the necessary and sufficient condition to pin down the boundary also for our model here with endogenous government spending response, except for some extremely large and unlikely values for χ Y . For such large values of χ Y , there is the possibility of an unstable solution, which we rule out by restricting the parameter space. Also, a set of the parameter values that imply a negative slope of the Phillips curve due to endogenous government spending is discarded. Due to the block recursive nature of the model, the boundary for fiscal policy can be obtained separately from that of monetary policy. See Bhattarai et al. (2014a) for details. 17 Note here that, as shown in the online appendix (section 1.2), the relationships between the feedback parameters of the nonlinear and linearized fiscal policy rules are given by
III. Empirical Analysis

A. Method
We solve the system of linearized equations for its statespace representation and then apply the solution method for the linear rational expectations models of Sims (2002) under determinacy. Under indeterminacy, we use a generalization of this method proposed in Lubik and Schorfheide (2003, 2004) , which expresses the solution of the model as
where z t is a vector of model variables, ε t is a vector of fundamental shocks, and ζ t is a vector of sunspot shocks. The coefficient matrices Γ * 1 (θ), Γ * 0,ε (θ), and Γ * 0,ζ (θ) are functions of the structural model parameters θ. The matrix Γ * 0,ζ (θ) = 0 under determinacy but is not 0 in general under indeterminacy. Thus, indeterminacy introduces additional parameters, given by the matrix M in equation (4), and a sunspot shock. 18 With a distributional assumption on ζ t (and ε t ), one can construct the likelihood of the solution of the model using the Kalman filter. We use standard Bayesian methods to fit the model to the data. 19 We conduct several convergence checks of our posterior simulations (the details are provided in the online appendix, section 4.3). For model comparison purposes, we estimate marginal likelihoods using the modified harmonic mean estimator by Geweke (1999) .
B. Data
We use six quarterly U.S. data as observables: per capita output growth, annualized inflation, annualized federal funds rate, tax revenues-to-output ratio, market value of government debt-to-output ratio, and government spendingto-output ratio. 20 To make our results comparable to the related literature, we estimate the model over two samples: a pre-Volcker sample from 1960:Q1 to 1979:Q2 and a post-Volcker sample from 1982:Q4 to 2008:Q2. 21 In particular, we drop the Volcker disinflation period. (A detailed description of the data and the corresponding measurement equations are given in the online appendix, section 2.) 18 The online appendix (section 3) provides a more detailed discussion of the solution method. Beyer and Farmer (2007) argue that some caution needs to be applied in using the methodology in Lubik and Schorfheide (2003, 2004) since one needs to make some assumption about the dynamic structure of the underlying model in distinguishing a determinate equilibrium from an indeterminate one. Lubik and Schorfheide (2007) reply that such identifying assumptions are inherent in any structural econometric work. For another recent application of the Lubik and Schorfheide (2003, 2004) method, see Bilbiie and Straub (2013) . 19 We explain details of the Bayesian methods in the online appendix (section 4.1). For a general introduction to Bayesian methods, see An and Schorfheide (2007) . 20 Note that we do not use data on government transfers, which is treated as an unobservable. 21 An alternative approach to split-sample estimation is a recurrent regimeswitching framework. Among other contributions, Sims and Zha (2006b) estimate a VAR, while Bianchi (2013) and Baele et al. (2015) estimate a DSGE model with regime switching in monetary policy. The last column presents the 5th and 95th percentiles. The prior distribution of φπ and ψb was obtained based on a simulation from the prior distribution of the structural parameters. Since the prior distribution of those parameters that determine the boundary condition of active and passive policy is identical pre-Volcker and post-Volcker, φπ and ψb also have the same prior distribution across the subsamples.
C. Prior Distributions
We calibrate ϕ = 1 andθ = 8 since they are not separately identified from α. We also calibrate ρ π * and ρ b * to 0.995 in order to restrict the role for time-varying policy targets to that of explaining low-frequency behavior of the data only. For the mean value of observables and the technology growth rate, we use sample specific priors. We use the same priors across the two sample periods for all other parameters. Most of the priors that we use are standard in the literature and are provided in the online appendix (section 4.2). We discuss in detail two sets of priors that are unique to our analysis.
The first are those for the two key policy parameters in the monetary and fiscal rules: φ π and ψ b . We reparameterize the model by introducing new parameters φ * π and ψ * b that measure the distance from the boundary of active and passive policies. Let us denote the boundary for monetary policy and fiscal policy by
, for the AMPF, PMAF, and PMPF regimes, respectively. We assume that φ * π and ψ * b have a gamma prior distribution whose domain is positive. This reparameterization thus ensures that we completely impose a particular policy regime during estimation. Imposing a particular policy regime through this reparameterization makes the posterior density behave well near the boundary of the policies, which leads to stable numerical operations in estimation and good convergence of posterior simulation. The implied 90% prior probability interval for φ π is (1.190, 1.812 1 ). 23 The second are those related to the case of indeterminacy. As mentioned above, indeterminacy introduces additional parameters, denoted by the matrix M in equation (4). We try The table reports log marginal likelihoods that are computed using the harmonic mean estimator proposed by John F. Geweke (1999) . a few alternate specifications for the priors of those parameters, and our results are robust. Our baseline specification is one where we set set the prior mean of M to 0. Since Γ * 0,ε (θ) and Γ * 0,ζ (θ) in equation (4) are orthogonal, this specification implies that the initial impact of fundamental shocks is orthogonal to that of sunspot shocks at the prior mean.
D. Model Comparison
To compare model fit, we use marginal likelihoods across different policy regime specifications. As table 2 makes clear, the best-fitting model is the PMPF regime pre-Volcker, which implies indeterminacy, and the AMPF regime post-Volcker. In this regard, our finding is in line with Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) . As we will show, however, the propagation mechanism under our PMPF regime is different from that under passive monetary policy in their paper. This underscores the importance of an explicit specification of both monetary and fiscal policies and the inclusion of fiscal variables in model estimation, as we discuss in detail later. 24
E. Posterior Estimates
For brevity, all the details of the posterior distributions are provided in the online appendix (section 4.2). Here, we discuss some of the major findings. As expected, the estimates of some key policy parameters are different across the two periods: the implied estimate of the posterior mean for φ π is 0.258 pre-Volcker and 1.348 post-Volcker, while for ψ b , it is 0.052 pre-Volcker and 0.096 post-Volcker. The 90% posterior probability interval for φ π is (0.032, 0.451) pre-Volcker and (0.971, 1.721) post-Volcker, while for ψ b , it is (0.012, 0.089) pre-Volcker and (0.031, 0.157) post-Volcker. In addition to the feedback parameters, we find that the 24 Moreover, note that although we estimate the model conditional on one policy regime at a time, it is possible to construct an unconditional posterior distribution of the parameters across all three policy regimes. This requires specifying a prior distribution over the policy regimes and then sampling from the posterior distribution of the parameters conditional on each policy regime, according to the posterior distribution over the policy regimes. However, since the best-fitting policy regime in both time periods dominates other policy regimes in terms of marginal likelihoods, with any reasonable prior distributions over the policy regimes, the unconditional posterior distribution of the parameters will be almost the same as the posterior distribution of the parameters conditional on the best-fitting policy regime. Finally, we estimate cumulative predictive likelihoods, following Geweke and Amisano (2010) , to understand relative fit of different policy regimes in the pre-Volcker period. The details of this additional exercise are presented in the online appendix (section 4.5). volatility of the two shocks in the monetary policy rule, ε π,t and ε R,t , changed significantly across the sample periods. The standard deviation of the shock to the inflation target dropped from 0.060 to 0.036, while the volatility of the monetary policy shock fell from 0.174 to 0.108. This finding is in line with that of Cogley et al. (2010) , even though our policy regime in the pre-Volcker period is different from theirs and, unlike them, we include fiscal variables in our estimation. In contrast to shocks in the monetary policy reaction function, there was no substantial change in the volatility of the two shocks in the fiscal policy rule, ε b,t and ε τ,t , after the Volcker disinflation.
In terms of exogenous processes not related to the policy reaction functions, the standard deviation of most shocks decreased in the post-Volcker compared to the pre-Volcker period. 25 For example, the standard deviation of the costpush shockû t declined by a quantitatively important amount, which probably reflects less significant oil price shocks in the post-Volcker period. The notable exception to this is the demand shockd t , which became more volatile in the post-Volcker period. In terms of the persistence parameter, while it decreased for most shocks, it increased quite a bit for the technology shockâ t and increased marginally for the government spending shockĝ t . With respect to the other structural model parameters, our estimates are largely consistent with results from similar subsample analyses in 25 Similar to Smets and Wouters (2007) , we normalized some shocks.
See the online appendix (section 1.2) for the model equations used in our estimation. Smets and Wouters (2007) , Cogley et al. (2010) , and Benati (2008) . 26
F. Propagation of Shocks
Transmission mechanism of policy. In figures 1 to 4 we present impulse responses to monetary and fiscal policy shocks in the two sample periods. Our main finding is that for the best-fitting models, PMPF pre-Volcker and AMPF post-Volcker, the monetary and fiscal policy transmission mechanisms are substantially different.
For the best-fitting model pre-Volcker, as shown in figure 1b, a monetary contraction (i.e., an unanticipated increase in the nominal interest rate) leads to an increase in output and inflation. 27 Thus our results provide a modelbased interpretation to the price puzzle of the identified VAR literature: the tendency of inflation to increase on impact following a contractionary monetary policy shock. Hanson (2004) in a comprehensive study showed that this price puzzle seems to be a feature only of the pre-Volcker period and not for the entire postwar U.S. data, which is consistent with 26 We have also undertaken prior sensitivity analysis using the method of Müller (2012) . The results, provided in the online appendix (section 4.4), show that the data are not very informative, and thus the prior distribution plays an important role in the posterior distribution for some of the parameters. In particular, the prior for ψ * b and χ Y does not get updated much after observing the data under PMPF in the pre-Volcker period and under AMPF in the post-Volcker period. We leave it for future research to fully analyze identification issues of some fiscal policy parameters in this class of models. 27 For comparison, we show the impulse responses to the inflation target shock in the online appendix (section V). our results. 28 In addition, figure 1a reveals that the PMAF model also generates similar unconventional responses of inflation and output to monetary policy shocks. The underlying mechanism, however, is different. Under PMAF, FTPL is operative, and thus an interest rate increase generates a positive wealth effect, which increases output and inflation. In our best-fitting estimated model, FTPL is not operative however and the results are due to indeterminacy. 29 The effects of fiscal policy shocks are also different from conventional wisdom in the pre-Volcker period. For example, an exogenous increase in the lump-sum tax-to-output ratio produces a recession, decreasing output and inflation, as shown in panel b of figure 2, an event one would not observe under conventional AMPF. The interest rate decreases as well, as it only weakly responds to lower inflation due to passive monetary policy. This type of response would also happen under FTPL: an increase in taxes leads to a negative wealth effect, which decreases spending and thereby inflation and output. This is shown in panel a of figure 2.
We thus find that our estimated best-fitting model pre-Volcker, the PMPF regime, mimics the PMAF regime in 28 Hanson (2004) also shows that for the pre-Volcker period, output also increases initially in response to an unanticipated increase in nominal interest rates. Our results are also consistent in this regard to his paper. This result, however, might be sensitive to different VAR specifications. For example, Castelnuovo and Surico (2010) , using a three-variable VAR with CBO-based measure of output gap, find a negative response of output gap due to an increase in nominal interest rate in the pre-Volcker era. 29 The reason for this similarity is that in this simple sticky-price model, it is only under PMPF or PMAF that inflation can increase in response to an unanticipated increase in interest rates (under AMPF, inflation would decrease, leading to an increase in the real interest rate and determinacy). some dimensions, although it is not technically one where FTPL is operative. Note that although the PMPF regime mimics the PMAF regime in the dimensions noted, it is different in other dimensions and thus is well identified. For example, note that the response of tax-to-output, debtto-output, and government spending-to-output ratios to a monetary shock is different in the two regimes in the pre-Volcker period. Moreover, as we discuss later in detail, while the impulse responses to policy shocks look similar, the strength of wealth-effect-based transmission mechanism of policy shocks implied by the PMAF regime is at odds with the data.
While the pre-Volcker U.S. economy was characterized by PMPF, it was under the AMPF regime post-Volcker. Accordingly, and unlike the pre-Volcker era, the impulse responses are in line with the predictions of standard monetary models: of figure 3a shows that an unanticipated increase in the nominal interest rate leads to a decrease, not an increase, in inflation. In addition, as panel a of figure 4 makes clear, exogenous adjustments in tax revenues do not affect output, inflation, and the interest rate, a conventional Ricardian equivalence result.
Interestingly, figures 3b and 4b show that post-Volcker, the PMPF model also produces quite similar dynamics to AMPF. For example, as shown in figure 3 , the impulse responses to a monetary contraction are quite similar between the two regimes, although the error bands are much wider under PMPF. Similarly, figure 4 illustrates that the two regimes have similar predictions also for the propagation of fiscal shocks, since an unanticipated increase in tax-to-output ratio has no meaningful impacts on output, inflation, and the interest rate while reducing debt-to-output ratio under both the regimes. While the dynamics are similar, since the PMPF regime involves many more estimated parameters, it is not favored over the AMPF regime in our Bayesian model comparison.
We emphasize that our results for the pre-Volcker period are data driven and not hard-wired into our model specification and estimation. Depending on how self-fulfilling beliefs are formed, as shown above, the model under PMPF can generate a wide range of dynamics, including those that are similar to the outcomes under AMPF or PMAF or neither. Each plot presents three impulse responses of each variable to 1 standard deviation shock to εR,t and ετ,t : (1) (dashed lines) impulse responses due to the determined part of initial impact of a shock, (2) (dashed-dotted lines) impulse responses due to the undetermined part of initial impact of a shock, and (3) (solid lines) the combined impulse responses of 1 and 2. The determined part of initial impact of a shock is uniquely pinned down by the structural parameters of the model, while the undetermined part of initial impact of a shock is not uniquely pinned down by the structural parameters because of additional free parameters.
With the additional parameters in M and the sunspot shocks, we characterize the full set of indeterminate beliefs and construct their distribution conditional on the data. While doing so, we find, for example, that the pre-Volcker data favor the agents' beliefs that inflation would increase in response to a monetary contraction. Under PMPF post-Volcker, however, we find that the agents did not believe that inflation would increase in response to interest rate increases. Similarly, the pre-Volcker data favor the agents' beliefs that inflation would decrease in response to fiscal contractions. Under PMPF post-Volcker, however, our estimates imply that the agents believed that inflation would increase in response to lump-sum tax increases on average. However, since the error band is quite wide and covers 0, the effect is not significant.
To make these mechanisms even more transparent, in figures 5a and 5b, we decompose the impulse responses to monetary policy shocks under PMPF in the two time periods into two components as given by equation (4): the part due to Γ * 0,ε (θ) that is uniquely determined by the structural parameters of the model and changes in nature compared to AMPF due to indeterminacy and the part due to Γ * 0,ζ (θ) M that is not uniquely determined by the structural parameters because of M and captures self-fulfilling beliefs. The solution gets affected even for the part of it that is uniquely pinned down by the structural parameters of the model. 30 In particular, the determined component implies that inflation increases in response to an increase in interest rates. Therefore, unless the undetermined component-the part governed by agents' self-fulfilling beliefs-countervails that effect sufficiently, the PMPF model generates a positive response of inflation to an increase in interest rates. As is clear from figure 5, pre-Volcker, self-fulfilling beliefs captured by the undetermined component imply an increase in inflation following a monetary contraction, which reinforces the effect from the determined component. In the post-Volcker period, however, the self-fulfilling beliefs imply a significant decrease in inflation. This countervailing effect from the undetermined component thus plays a decisive role post-Volcker in the overall negative response of inflation to a positive interest rate shock. Similarly, in figures 5c and 5d, we decompose the impulse responses to fiscal policy shocks under PMPF in the two time periods into the determined and undetermined components. As is clear, while pre-Volcker, self-fulfilling beliefs captured by the undetermined component imply a decrease in inflation following a fiscal contraction, post-Volcker, they imply an increase in inflation. The undetermined component thus plays a decisive role in both the periods in pinning down the response of inflation to a lump-sum tax shock.
Variance decomposition. We showed that transmission mechanisms of monetary and fiscal policies are substantially different in the two time periods. We next assess how important the random components in policies were in explaining variations in inflation and output growth. Variance decomposition results, as given in tables 3 and 4, show that in both time periods and in both the short run (four quarters) and the long run (fourty quarters), unanticipated shifts in monetary and fiscal policies play only a minor role in explaining the dynamics of inflation and output.
For example, for inflation, pre-Volcker, monetary and fiscal policy shocks explain less than 11% of the variation at both horizons. In particular, pre-Volcker, lump-sum tax shocks explain 2.7% of inflation variation in the short run and 0.9% in the long run. These effects, while smaller, are roughly similar to those of monetary policy shocks, which explain 10.7% of inflation variation in the short run and 5.7% in the long run. Post-Volcker, while the fiscal policy shock explains no variation at either horizon because the prevailing regime is AMPF, the monetary policy shock also is estimated to explain basically no variation at either horizon.
For output growth, pre-Volcker, monetary policy shocks explain around 1.6%, while fiscal policy shocks explain around 4.6% of the variation in both the short and long run. Post-Volcker, the monetary shock explains around 2.5% of the variation at both horizons, while fiscal policy shocks explain basically no variation in output growth. Our result that random variations in monetary policy do not explain much of the fluctuations in inflation and output is consistent with the results in the identified VAR literature (Sims & Zha, 2006a) . That the same conclusion also holds for random variations in fiscal policy, given by unanticipated movements in taxes, is new, as far as we are aware, to the literature on estimated DSGE models that jointly feature both monetary and fiscal policies.
We next assess the role of the time-varying inflation target in explaining inflation dynamics-in particular, the rise in inflation in the pre-Volcker period. In the recent estimated DSGE literature, a finding has emerged that the long-run variation in inflation is explained mostly by shocks to the inflation target in the monetary reaction function. For example, Ireland (2007) and Cogley et al. (2010) show that both pre-and post-Volcker, smoothed values of the inflation target recovered from estimation track actual inflation remarkably well. In contrast, we find that pre-Volcker, as opposed to post-Volcker, variations in the inflation target do not explain low-frequency movements in inflation. Table 3 clearly shows that while we find a similar result to Cogley et al. (2010) in the post-Volcker period, where the inflation target shock accounts for 82.6% of the long-run variation in inflation, our results are quite different in the pre-Volcker era, where the inflation target shock explains only 10.1% of the long-run variation in inflation. We also make this result clear in figure 6, which plots smoothed inflation target recovered from the estimation of the model in the two time periods under various policy regime combinations. While inflation target changes track inflation well under an AMPF regime, this correspondence weakens substantially under either PMPF or PMAF.
The major reason for this difference is that we explicitly allow for the possibility of indeterminacy while estimating our model that features both monetary and fiscal policy. When the regime is active monetary and passive fiscal policy, as is the implicit assumption in Ireland (2007) and Cogley et al. (2010) for both time periods, then changes in inflation target do explain inflation in the long run since monetary policy fully controls inflation dynamics. Our best-fitting estimated model in the pre-Volcker features indeterminacy due to passive monetary policy, however. In this case, consider an increase in the inflation target. This, through the central bank reaction function, does tend to decrease the interest rate. A decrease in interest rate in this model, though, as we pointed out, tends to decrease inflation. Thus, inflation target movements do not track actual inflation in the long run. Figure 6 thus makes clear how the role of time-varying inflation target in explaining the low-frequency movement in inflation depends crucially on the monetary and fiscal policy regime in place.
We now address in detail which shocks were major drivers of the dynamics of inflation. Our main finding is that the primary sources of short-and long-run variations in inflation are quite different in the two time periods as the propagation mechanism of shocks varies because of the change in monetary policy stances. As mentioned above and shown in table 3, post-Volcker, low-frequency movement in inflation is explained mostly by changes in the inflation target (82.6%). The high-frequency movement is mostly explained by markup shocks (71.2%), also a standard result in the literature. In the pre-Volcker period, in contrast, no single shock played a predominant role; rather all three types of nonpolicy shocks-the demand shock, the technology shock, and the markup shock-were major drivers of inflation dynamics. They collectively account for 75% of the short-run variation and 79.8% of the long-run variation in inflation. The important role of markup shocks at both horizons in the pre-Volcker period is not surprising given the oil price shocks of the 1970s. Moreover, in the pre-Volcker period, since the monetary policy regime was passive, such nonpolicy shocks, whose effects on inflation would typically be stabilized under active monetary policy over the long run, end up influencing inflation dynamics significantly. To illustrate this role of nonpolicy shocks, in the online appendix (section 6.1), we report the counterfactual path of inflation under PMPF in the pre-Volcker period if we simulate our model using the posterior distribution of all other shocks while shutting down nonpolicy shocks. The rise of inflation in the 1970s is muted in that case.
Finally, how important are sunspot shocks in explaining variation in inflation and output growth in the pre-Volcker period? As tables 3 and 4 make clear, sunspot shocks introduced due to indeterminacy play a quite minor role in explaining the dynamics of inflation and output. Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) also found a minor role of sunspot shocks. Indeterminacy matters in our estimated model not because of a nontrivial role for sunspot fluctuations but mostly because self-fulfilling beliefs regarding fundamental shocks significantly alter the propagation mechanisms in the model. 31 Role of policy in the rise of inflation. Having found that neither exogenous variations in the inflation target nor sunspot shocks played a major role in the rise of inflation and its high volatility in the pre-Volcker period, we now evaluate the role of changes in the monetary policy regime, which can presumably be important given the nontrivial influences on inflation of the nonpolicy shocks pre-Volcker. To this end, we conduct a counterfactual exercise assessing the modelimplied path of various observables had the post-Volcker monetary policy regime been in place since 1962:Q1 in the pre-Volcker period. Specifically, using the posterior distribution of model parameters and shocks of the pre-Volcker period, we simulate our model from 1962:Q1 onward by setting φ π and φ Y to their respective posterior mean in the post-Volcker period. 32 First, we find that the model-implied standard deviation of inflation is 2.03%, which is substantially lower than the actual value of 2.72%. Moreover, figure 7, where we plot the model-implied path of inflation together with actual inflation, makes clear that under this monetary policy regime, the rise of inflation in the 1970s would have been avoided. Thus, our counterfactual exercise suggests that a change in the systematic response of monetary policy would have mattered greatly for inflation dynamics in the pre-Volcker era. Second, we find that output would not have been very different. This is because the slope of the Phillips curve is relatively steep in the pre-Volcker period and thus there was little short-run trade-off between output and inflation. 31 In the interest of space, we present the detailed variance decomposition of government debt in the online appendix (section 6.2). During both preand post-Volcker, the transfer shock explains the majority of the variation in the debt-to-output ratio in the short run (62% and 75%, respectively), but plays a minor role in the long run. The lump-sum tax shock explains some variation in the short run for both periods, with its role reduced in the long run, while the monetary policy shock is not relevant in either horizon. In the long run, for pre-Volcker, while the government spending shock explains the most (37%), there is a nontrivial contribution also of preference, technology, and markup shocks and no contribution of the inflation target shock. Post-Volcker, the role of the government spending shock gets amplified substantially, as it explains 61.5% of the variation, with no role for technology and markup shocks, but much more of a role of the inflation target shock, which now explains 11.1% of the variation. Thus, some differences do exist in terms of the underlying sources of debt dynamics in the two periods. 32 Note here that we keep the fiscal parameters the same as the estimated values in the pre-Volcker period. We shut down the exogenous shock in the monetary policy rule ε R,t to consider in isolation the effect on inflation dynamics of a change in the systematic response of monetary policy. We did not shut down the inflation target shockπ * t , but our result is robust even whenπ * t is shut down because the estimated inflation target shock does not fluctuate much under PMPF, pre-Volcker. In other words, under PMPF in the pre-Volcker period, inflation dynamics with and without these shocks are virtually identical, as our earlier variance decomposition results make clear.
G. Discussion
We have so far presented various quantitative results, conditional on the best-fitting policy regimes given in table 2. The model-fit result for the post-Volcker period is standard and conventional for any subsample estimation exercise. For the pre-Volcker period, however, some previous studies, focusing on determinate policy regimes, suggest evidence for the PMAF regime. 33 Therefore, one may naturally ask what factors contribute to our result that the PMPF regime is preferred to the PMAF regime in the pre-Volcker period. This section addresses this question in a variety of ways. We also argue that including fiscal policy explicitly in the model and using fiscal variables in estimation indeed played an important role for our model-fit result. We finally conduct several robustness exercises.
Model fit. What features of the data, within the context of our estimated model, account for the model selection result in the pre-Volcker period? We find that the most significant discrepancies between the PMAF regime and the data lie in the joint dynamics of inflation, interest rates, and debt, and this is precisely where the PMAF regime fares worse than the PMPF regime.
The poor performance of the PMAF regime is a result of the combination of the predominant role of monetary policy shocks and the wealth effects that arise under that policy regime. 34 While the monetary policy shock plays a minor role under PMPF, as shown above, it is in fact the main driving force for the joint dynamics of inflation, interest rates, and debt under PMAF. Monetary policy shock explains 33% of inflation and 96% of interest rate variation in the short run and 52% of inflation and interest rate variation in the long run. In addition, the same shock plays a significant role for debt dynamics, especially at a longer horizon (40%). Monetary policy shocks affect these variables through wealth effects, as the FTPL is operative under PMAF. The resulting model dynamics, however, are at odds with the data.
As can be seen from panel a of figure 1, a monetary policy shock under PMAF moves inflation, interest rates, and debt in the same direction due to the FTPL mechanism (i.e., the wealth effects caused by changes in interest rates). Moreover, the effect of the shock is highly persistent, as can also be seen clearly from the impulse responses, because a monetary policy shock generates such wealth effects through its influence on debt, which itself moves sluggishly due to its 33 Traum and Yang (2011) find evidence for PMAF using a different model and data. In the future, it will be interesting to fully explore the main reasons for this difference. Moreover, in an interesting paper, Bianchi and Ilut (2015) use a regime switching setup from a PMAF regime to an AMPF regime to explain the rise of inflation in the 1970s. Compared to our split-sample estimation, they find the date of the switch endogenously and assess the effects of regime-switching, but they do not conduct a formal model comparison exercise while allowing for indeterminacy. We leave it for future research to address these issues with a method that allows for regime switching, as well as equilibrium indeterminacy, and enables a model comparison. 34 Bhattarai et al. (2014a) contains a detailed analysis of these wealth effects in a simpler sticky price model. dependence on the amount of debt carried over from the previous period (i.e., b t−1 is in the law of motion for debt b t ). Such long-lasting wealth effects lead to a large degree of autocorrelation of inflation and interest rates and also a large degree of cross-correlation between the two variables. These model dynamics, however, are at odds with the data, as actual inflation and interest rates are much less persistent. Furthermore, the positive cross-correlation between interest rates and debt and also between inflation and debt implied by the PMAF regime is also problematic, as the data clearly indicate that the correlations are negative. The online appendix (section 8.1) provides more discussions and figures that compare autocorrelations and cross-correlations of the data to those implied by each of the policy regimes in the model.
Overall, we find that the wealth-effect-based mechanism of a significant size that is predicted by our estimated PMAF regime is not observed in the data in the pre-Volcker period. Thus, this mechanism and the PMAF regime do not seem to explain the joint dynamics of inflation, interest rates, and debt.
External evidence on policy regimes. The previous section discusses why the PMAF regime is inferior to the PMPF regime in matching the data within our structural estimation framework. While there are benefits of estimating structural equilibrium models when assessing which policy regime in fact prevailed, this approach has an obvious shortcoming that one's finding inevitably depends on the model structure, at least partially. 35 We therefore supplement our 35 Related to this point that the results are partly driven by model structure, Davig and Leeper (2007a) point out that the condition for (in)determinacy is different in models in which policy reaction coefficients evolve exogenously according to a Markov process. It will be interesting to develop a framework that can allow for monetary/fiscal policy regime switching, as well as indeterminacy, and to investigate whether model comparison results are different in such an alternative framework. exercise by providing external evidence for a passive fiscal policy regime during this period, as well as for self-fulfilling beliefs, based on earlier empirical studies that impose less structure. First, we estimate single equation fiscal policy reaction functions of Bohn (1998) with quarterly data and also for the precise sample period considered in our paper. (The details of the specification and estimation results are provided in the online appendix, section 8.2.) We indeed find that fiscal policy was passive in the pre-Volcker period. 36 Second, in a framework in the spirit of Leduc, Sill, and Stark (2007) , we use the Livingston Survey data on expected inflation (and the timing of the survey to motivate a recursive ordering) like them and align the data to be as close as possible to the one used in our DSGE model estimation. The details of the specification and VAR estimation procedure are in the online appendix (section 8.3). We find that pre-Volcker, the shock to expected inflation was not stabilized and led to persistent effects on actual inflation. This thus suggests a role for self-fulfilling beliefs in the pre-Volcker era, as was the argument of Leduc et al. (2007). 37 Role of fiscal policy. We now assess the role played by including fiscal policy explicitly in the model and using fiscal variables as observables in estimation on inference and identification in the pre-Volcker period. It is perhaps easy to see some direct benefits of including fiscal variables in the model and estimation. For example, without it, one would not be able to make a meaningful inference regarding the effects of fiscal policy changes on key aggregate variables such as inflation and output. We have shown that these effects were statistically significant in the pre-Volcker period. Moreover, dropping fiscal policy from the model would preclude the possibility of the PMAF regime, which potentially biases our inference toward indeterminacy. There are, however, some additional benefits on which we focus next.
First, under PMPF and indeterminacy, excluding an explicit specification of fiscal policy can be a source of misspecification. For example, in Bhattarai et al. (2014a) , we show analytically in a simple sticky-price model with lumpsum taxes that Γ * 0,ε (θ), the determined component of the solution under indeterminacy, depends on both monetary and fiscal policy parameters. Thus, dropping fiscal policy, even if fiscal policy is passive, is not innocuous. Second, we illustrate that including fiscal variables in the model and estimation provides additional information about the selffulfilling beliefs of the agents, which in turn leads to a better identification of the matrix M and more robust inference regarding the propagation of monetary policy shocks under PMPF. This is because in a model with monetary and fiscal policy interactions, under PMPF, M Rζ in M that corresponds to the monetary policy shock influences the impact of monetary policy shocks on not only output, inflation, and the interest rate but also, fiscal variables. Therefore, using data on fiscal variables can provide an additional source of identification. These results, shown in the online appendix (section 7.1), clarify that only when we include fiscal variables in the model and estimation for the pre-Volcker period, as we discussed above, are our results robust to what prior we assign to M. In addition, we consider another experiment to highlight the role of fiscal variables in our model comparison results. In particular, we now include fiscal policy in the model but drop fiscal variables from estimation. Thus, while the model continues to have government debt and taxes, we do not use data on those variables. In the online appendix (section 7.2), we show that our model comparison results continue to hold as in the baseline case: pre-Volcker, the PMPF regime fits the data best. 38
Robustness. We conduct five major robustness exercises: a monetary aggregate is included in the monetary policy reaction function; we estimate the model without time-varying inflation and debt targets is estimated; we estimate the model with an ARMA specification for the shocks; looser priors are considered on the key policy parameters by increasing the standard deviation on the prior distributions of φ * π , ψ * b , and φ Y ; and we extend the post-Volcker sample to include the observations from the Volcker disinflation period (1979:Q3-1982:Q3) . These alternative specifications do not affect the substantive results of our paper. (The details of all the results from this section are provided in the online appendix, section 9.)
IV. Conclusion
In this paper we have addressed some long-standing questions in macroeconomics using an estimated DSGE model that has an explicit description of both monetary and fiscal policies. Our main result is that the monetary and fiscal policy regime combination in place has mattered historically for a host of issues: the prevalence of equilibrium indeterminacy, the transmission mechanism of monetary and fiscal policy, and the major sources of variation in inflation. That is, we find the nature of the systematic response of policy to the state of the economy to be paramount in the propagation mechanism of both policy and nonpolicy shocks.
In future research projects, we plan to extend and build on our current work on three fronts. First, we can conduct our analysis using a medium-scale DSGE model such as the one in Smets and Wouters (2007) , Del Negro et al. (2007) , and Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2010) , with a detailed specification of fiscal policy such as distortionary taxes and long-term debt. Second, we can allow for time-varying volatility of shocks in our estimated DSGE model, along the lines of Justiniano and Primiceri (2008) . Third, we can estimate a DSGE model with recurring regime switching in both monetary and fiscal policies, building on the methodology provided in Farmer, Waggoner, and Zha (2011) or Davig and Leeper (2007a) . Another related approach we can adopt is the time-varying policy parameters setup in Inoue and Rossi (2011) or Fernandez-Villaverde, Guerron-Quintana, and Rubio-Ramirez (2010).
